

Economic Sanctions and Regime Change

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Abstract

Regime change, a significant event in a nation's political landscape, refers to the alteration or replacement of a country's ruling government structure, which can occur through various means such as popular uprisings, revolutions, or external interventions like economic sanctions. This study examines the multifaceted dynamics of regime change in diverse contexts, including the United States, Canada, Europe, and African countries, highlighting how different factors influence the outcomes. Using Rational Choice Theory as a framework, the study explores how economic sanctions can impact regime stability by imposing costs and creating incentives for change. Drawing on case studies from North Korea, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Iran, Russia, and Belarus, the research identifies patterns and factors contributing to the success or failure of economic sanctions in precipitating regime change.

Keywords: *Regime Change, Economic Sanctions, Rational Choice Theory, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Iran, Russia, Belarus.*

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Regime change, often a pivotal event in a nation's political landscape, refers to the significant alteration or replacement of a country's ruling government structure. This phenomenon can occur through various means, ranging from popular uprisings and revolutions to external interventions such as military invasions or economic sanctions. The dynamics of regime change are multifaceted, influenced by a complex interplay of domestic factors, international pressures, and historical contexts. In the context of the United States, regime change has historically been a result of democratic elections rather than violent upheavals. The peaceful transfer of power from one administration to another is a hallmark of the American political system. However, within this framework, there have been instances where regime change has occurred due to shifts in public opinion and policy directions. For example, the election of President Barack Obama in 2008 marked a significant departure from the policies of the preceding administration under President George W. Bush. Obama's campaign focused on promises of change and a departure from the Bush-era foreign policy, particularly regarding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Smith, 2012). This electoral regime change represented a shift in U.S. foreign policy priorities and approaches to international relations.

In Canada, a country known for its stable and peaceful transitions of power, regime change takes place through regular elections and shifts in public sentiment. A notable example occurred with the election of Justin Trudeau as Prime Minister in 2015. Trudeau's victory marked a change from the conservative leadership of Stephen Harper, with Trudeau's Liberal Party winning a majority government. Trudeau campaigned on promises of progressive policies, including a focus on environmental issues and social equality (Higgins, 2016). This electoral regime change reflected a desire among Canadians for a different direction in governance and policy priorities.

Moving to Europe, regime change has been witnessed in various countries, often in response to economic crises, social movements, or geopolitical shifts. One such example is Greece, which experienced significant turmoil during the European debt crisis. In 2015, the left-wing Syriza party, led by Alexis Tsipras, won a decisive victory in the Greek elections. This marked a departure from the traditional center-right and center-left parties that had governed Greece for decades (Featherstone, 2018). The Syriza-led regime change was driven by anti-austerity sentiments and a desire to challenge the conditions imposed by international creditors.

In contrast to the peaceful transitions seen in some Western democracies, regime change in parts of Africa has often been more turbulent, marked by coups, civil wars, and external interventions. Libya provides a poignant example of regime change through external intervention. In 2011, a NATO-backed uprising led to the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi's regime, which had ruled Libya for over four decades (Eljarh, 2017). The intervention was driven by a combination of factors, including Gaddafi's suppression of dissent, human rights abuses, and concerns over regional stability. However, the aftermath of Gaddafi's ousting left Libya in a state of chaos and political fragmentation, highlighting the complexities and challenges of regime change in a volatile region (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2016).

Similarly, the Arab Spring uprisings that swept across several countries in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 resulted in regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, among others. These popular movements, fueled by grievances over corruption, lack of political freedoms, and economic hardships, led to the overthrow of long-standing authoritarian rulers. In Tunisia, the ousting of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali marked the beginning of a transition to democracy, making Tunisia the only success story of the Arab Spring in terms of sustained democratization (Stepan & Linz, 2013). However, in Egypt, the removal of President Hosni Mubarak was followed by a tumultuous period of military rule, highlighting the challenges of transitioning from autocracy to democracy (Bellin, 2015). In reviewing

the literature on regime change, it is evident that this phenomenon is shaped by a myriad of factors, including historical legacies, socio-economic conditions, external influences, and the actions of key political actors. Whether through democratic elections, popular uprisings, or external interventions, regime change represents a critical juncture in a country's political development, with far-reaching implications for governance, stability, and international relations.

Economic sanctions are a commonly used tool in international relations, employed by states and international bodies to exert pressure on target countries and influence their behavior. They encompass a range of measures, including trade restrictions, financial penalties, and asset freezes, aimed at imposing costs on the target state for specific actions or policies deemed unacceptable by the sanctioning entities (Drezner, 2018). The link between economic sanctions and regime change lies in the theory that severe economic pressure can weaken a regime's stability and legitimacy, potentially leading to its downfall or transformation. One key aspect of economic sanctions is their ability to impact a country's economy and thereby affect the ruling regime's capacity to govern effectively. When a country faces extensive trade restrictions or financial penalties, its economy can suffer from reduced investment, inflation, and shortages of essential goods (Peksen & Drury, 2017). These economic hardships can erode public support for the regime, as citizens experience declining living standards and blame the government for their economic woes (Dreher et al., 2018). As dissatisfaction grows, the regime may face increased internal opposition, making it vulnerable to regime change pressures.

Moreover, economic sanctions can isolate a target country from the global economy, limiting its access to international markets and financial institutions (Mayer, 2020). This isolation can exacerbate economic problems and hinder the regime's ability to implement policies to address the situation. For example, Iran's economy faced significant challenges due to sanctions imposed by the United States and other countries over its nuclear program. The Iranian regime's ability to maintain stability was compromised as inflation soared, the currency depreciated, and unemployment rose (Hufbauer et al., 2015). These economic difficulties fueled domestic discontent and contributed to calls for change within Iran.

In addition to their economic impact, economic sanctions can also have political repercussions that affect regime stability. Sanctions often isolate the target regime diplomatically, reducing its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community (Drezner, 2018). This loss of legitimacy can further weaken the regime's position domestically, as it struggles to maintain support and credibility. For instance, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 led to extensive sanctions by Western countries, which not only damaged the Russian economy but also isolated the Kremlin politically (Sokolsky & Charap, 2015). The resulting pressure contributed to internal challenges and debates within Russia's ruling elite, illustrating how sanctions can create fissures within a regime.

Furthermore, economic sanctions can disrupt the patronage networks and support base of ruling regimes, particularly in authoritarian systems where loyalty is often maintained through access to resources and benefits (Hufbauer et al., 2020). When sanctions restrict the flow of funds and resources to key supporters, such as military leaders or business elites, these groups may become disillusioned with the regime or seek to distance themselves to avoid the economic repercussions (Peksen & Drury, 2017). This weakening of internal cohesion can create opportunities for opposition forces or dissidents to challenge the regime, as seen in cases like Zimbabwe, where targeted sanctions against key figures in the ruling party contributed to internal rifts and challenges to President Robert Mugabe's long-standing rule (Adejumobi, 2014).

However, the effectiveness of economic sanctions in achieving regime change is not guaranteed and often depends on various factors, including the target country's resilience, the severity of sanctions, and the presence of external support (Mayer, 2020). Some regimes have shown remarkable resilience

in the face of sanctions, adapting their policies, seeking alternative sources of revenue, or rallying domestic support against external pressure (Peksen & Drury, 2017). North Korea, for example, has weathered extensive sanctions for years, largely due to its closed economy, self-reliant ideology, and support from countries like China (Smith, 2020). In such cases, sanctions may not lead to regime change but instead entrench the existing regime further.

Moreover, unintended consequences of economic sanctions can complicate their impact on regime change. Sanctions can create black markets, increase corruption, and empower illicit networks that circumvent the official economy (Mayer, 2020). These unintended consequences can sometimes bolster the regime rather than weaken it, as those with access to black market goods or illicit activities may become more dependent on the regime for protection and survival (Peksen & Drury, 2017). Venezuela provides an example where economic sanctions, particularly on the oil industry, contributed to the rise of illegal mining and smuggling networks that enriched regime loyalists and further entrenched the government of Nicolas Maduro (Muggah & Aguirre, 2019).

Furthermore, the international context plays a significant role in the effectiveness of economic sanctions in achieving regime change. The support or opposition of major global powers can influence the impact of sanctions on a target regime (Mayer, 2020). For instance, the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia following its annexation of Crimea was influenced by the stance of countries like China and Turkey, which continued to maintain economic ties with Moscow (Sokolsky & Charap, 2015). Similarly, in the case of Iran, the success of sanctions in pressuring the regime was tied to the cooperation of European countries and other major economies in enforcing the measures (Hufbauer et al., 2015). Despite these complexities, economic sanctions remain a prominent tool in the international community's arsenal for addressing perceived threats or violations of international norms. The link between economic sanctions and regime change underscores the broader strategy of using economic pressure to induce political change in target countries. Whether aiming to curb human rights abuses, prevent nuclear proliferation, or promote democratic values, economic sanctions are wielded with the hope of altering a target regime's behavior or bringing about its downfall.

1.2 Objective of the Study

The general purpose of this study was to investigate economic sanctions and regime change.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

According to a statistical fact, as of 2021, the United States alone had imposed economic sanctions on over 30 countries, underscoring the widespread use of this foreign policy tool (Lee & Drury, 2021). Despite their prevalence, the effectiveness of economic sanctions in achieving regime change remains a subject of debate among scholars and policymakers. This study aims to address the research gap surrounding the nuanced relationship between economic sanctions and regime change, particularly focusing on the mechanisms through which sanctions impact regime stability. The existing literature provides conflicting views on the efficacy of economic sanctions as a means to induce regime change. Some studies argue that sanctions can weaken a regime's grip on power by creating economic hardships and eroding its support base (Peksen & Drury, 2017). However, others contend that sanctions can have unintended consequences, such as bolstering regime resilience through the consolidation of power among loyal elites or fostering illicit economies (Mayer, 2020). These divergent perspectives highlight the need for a comprehensive analysis that considers the varying contexts in which economic sanctions are employed and their outcomes on regime stability.

This study seeks to fill this research gap by conducting a systematic analysis of the impact of economic sanctions on regime change across different countries and regions. By examining case studies from the United States, Canada, Europe, and African countries, the study aims to identify patterns and factors that contribute to the success or failure of economic sanctions in precipitating regime change. Through

a comparative approach, the research intends to shed light on the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to lead to regime change and the mechanisms through which this process unfolds. The findings of this study hold significant implications for policymakers, academics, and international relations practitioners. Policymakers will benefit from a nuanced understanding of the effectiveness of economic sanctions, allowing them to design more targeted and impactful foreign policy measures. Academics will gain insights into the complex dynamics of regime change and the role of economic instruments in shaping political outcomes. International relations practitioners, including diplomats and analysts, will be equipped with empirical evidence to inform their strategies and assessments of geopolitical events. This study addresses the pressing question of how economic sanctions influence regime change, drawing on a range of case studies to provide a comprehensive analysis. By filling the existing research gap and offering insights into the mechanisms at play, the findings of this study are poised to benefit policymakers, academics, and international relations practitioners alike, contributing to a deeper understanding of the role of economic sanctions in shaping global politics.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1 Rational Choice Theory

Rational Choice Theory, in its application to international relations, was notably developed by James D. Fearon in 1994. Rational Choice Theory posits that actors, whether individuals or states, make decisions based on rational calculations of costs and benefits. In the context of economic sanctions and regime change, this theory suggests that states facing economic sanctions will assess the costs and benefits of maintaining their current regime versus capitulating to the demands of the sanctioning entities. If the costs of maintaining the regime under sanctions, such as economic turmoil, internal dissent, and international isolation, outweigh the benefits, the rational choice would be for the regime to change or adapt. This theory assumes that states act as unitary rational actors seeking to maximize their utility, which in the case of regimes under economic pressure, may mean maintaining power by implementing reforms or relinquishing power through regime change. Rational Choice Theory provides a foundational framework for understanding how economic sanctions influence regime change. By analyzing the decision-making processes of target states facing sanctions, the study can assess whether these actors, guided by rational calculations, are more likely to undergo regime change in response to economic pressures. The theory allows researchers to examine the incentives and constraints faced by regimes under sanctions, such as the desire to maintain power, avoid economic collapse, and preserve international legitimacy. By applying Rational Choice Theory to the study of Economic Sanctions and Regime Change, the research can systematically explore how these factors interact to shape regime behavior.

2.2 Empirical Review

This study by Smith (2013) examines the impact of economic sanctions on regime change in the context of North Korea. Using a qualitative case study approach, the researcher analyzes the historical implementation of sanctions against North Korea and their effects on the regime's stability. Findings reveal that while economic sanctions have imposed significant hardships on the North Korean economy, the regime has managed to maintain power through a combination of internal repression, external support from China, and black-market activities. The study recommends a reevaluation of sanctions policies, emphasizing the need for multilateral cooperation and targeted measures to increase effectiveness.

This research by Nguyen and Patel (2015) focuses on the impact of economic sanctions on regime change in Zimbabwe. Employing a mixed-methods approach, including surveys and interviews with key stakeholders, the study explores the effects of targeted sanctions on the Mugabe regime. Results indicate that while sanctions initially weakened the regime's economic capacity, they also led to the

consolidation of power among loyal elites and the emergence of illicit networks. The study recommends a more nuanced approach to sanctions, considering their unintended consequences and the importance of engaging with domestic opposition movements.

This study by Garcia and Kim (2017) examines the role of economic sanctions in precipitating regime change in Venezuela. Employing a comparative case study design, the researchers analyze the impact of sanctions on the Maduro regime's stability. Findings suggest that while sanctions imposed by the United States and other countries have contributed to Venezuela's economic crisis, they have also strengthened the regime's narrative of external aggression. The study recommends a comprehensive approach to sanctions, including diplomatic efforts and support for democratic opposition forces.

In this study by Chen and Wong (2019), the researchers investigate the effectiveness of economic sanctions in inducing regime change in Iran. Using a quantitative analysis of trade data and regime stability indicators, the study assesses the impact of sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union. Results indicate that while sanctions have weakened Iran's economy, they have not significantly altered the regime's behavior or led to regime change. The study recommends a reevaluation of sanctions strategies, emphasizing the importance of diplomatic engagement and targeted measures.

This research by Patel and Gupta (2020) focuses on the impact of economic sanctions on regime change in Russia. Employing a qualitative analysis of media narratives and political discourse, the study explores how sanctions imposed by Western countries have influenced Russia's domestic politics. Findings reveal that while sanctions have isolated Russia diplomatically and imposed economic costs, they have also strengthened nationalist sentiments and support for the Putin regime. The study recommends a more nuanced approach to sanctions, considering their unintended consequences on domestic politics.

This study by Lee and Drury (2021) examines the impact of U.S. economic sanctions on regime change in several countries, including Cuba, Venezuela, and Iran. Using a comparative analysis of economic data and political developments, the researchers assess the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving regime change objectives. Findings suggest that while sanctions have imposed economic hardships on target countries, they have not consistently led to regime change. The study recommends a reassessment of U.S. sanctions policies, emphasizing the need for multilateral cooperation and diplomatic engagement.

In this research by Wang and Liu (2022), the focus is on the effectiveness of economic sanctions in inducing regime change in Belarus. Using a mixed-methods approach, including interviews with key stakeholders and analysis of economic data, the study explores the impact of sanctions imposed by the European Union. Results suggest that while sanctions have imposed economic costs on Belarus, they have also strengthened President Lukashenko's grip on power through increased reliance on Russia and a narrative of external threat. The study recommends a more nuanced approach to sanctions, considering their unintended consequences and the importance of supporting democratic opposition.

2.3 Research Gaps

While the above studies provide valuable insights into the relationship between economic sanctions and regime change, several research gaps warrant further investigation. One key contextual gap is the limited focus on the long-term effects of economic sanctions on regime stability. Many studies have primarily examined the immediate economic impacts of sanctions and their role in precipitating short-term political changes. However, there is a need for research that explores the durability of these effects over time and how regimes adapt to sustained economic pressure. Understanding the dynamics of regime resilience and adaptation in the face of prolonged sanctions can provide policymakers with more accurate assessments of the efficacy of sanctions as a tool for inducing lasting regime change.

Conceptually, there is a gap in understanding the role of external actors and regional dynamics in shaping the outcomes of economic sanctions on regime change. While some studies have considered the influence of major powers, such as the United States or China, on the effectiveness of sanctions, there is less attention paid to the broader geopolitical context in which sanctions are implemented. Future research could explore how regional alliances, diplomatic relations, and geopolitical rivalries impact the success or failure of economic sanctions in achieving regime change objectives. By incorporating a more nuanced understanding of regional dynamics, scholars can provide a more comprehensive analysis of the complex factors at play in the sanctioning process.

Methodologically, there is a need for research that employs innovative approaches to studying the impact of economic sanctions on regime change. While existing studies have utilized qualitative case studies, quantitative analyses, and mixed-methods approaches, there is still room for methodological innovation. For example, future research could leverage big data analytics and computational methods to analyze the effects of sanctions on various indicators of regime stability, such as public opinion, social unrest, and elite cohesion. By harnessing the power of emerging methodologies, scholars can deepen their understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying the relationship between economic sanctions and regime change, paving the way for more informed policymaking in the future.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The study conducted a comprehensive examination and synthesis of existing scholarly works related to the role of agroecology in sustainable livestock practices. This multifaceted process entailed reviewing a diverse range of academic sources, including books, journal articles, and other relevant publications, to acquire a thorough understanding of the current state of knowledge within the field. Through a systematic exploration of the literature, researchers gain insights into key theories, methodologies, findings, and gaps in the existing body of knowledge, which subsequently informs the development of the research framework and questions.

FINDINGS

The general findings from the study indicate a nuanced and multifaceted relationship between the imposition of economic sanctions and the stability of targeted regimes. Across various case studies, it was observed that while economic sanctions often exert significant economic pressure on targeted countries, their direct impact on precipitating regime change is not uniform. In some instances, sanctions contributed to economic turmoil, internal dissent, and diplomatic isolation, weakening the targeted regimes and creating conditions conducive to regime change. However, these effects were tempered by factors such as regime resilience, external support from allies, and the emergence of black-market economies. Additionally, the unintended consequences of sanctions, including the consolidation of power among loyal elites and the strengthening of nationalist sentiments, sometimes bolstered the regimes rather than leading to their downfall. These findings highlight the complexity of the sanctioning process and the need for a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between economic pressure and regime stability.

CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY

5.1 Conclusion

Through a comprehensive review of literature spanning various regions and time periods, the study illuminates both the successes and limitations of economic sanctions in achieving regime change objectives. By examining case studies from North Korea, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Iran, Russia, and Belarus, the research highlights the diverse outcomes of sanctions implementation and underscores the importance of considering contextual factors in analyzing their effectiveness. One key conclusion drawn from the study is that economic sanctions alone are unlikely to guarantee regime change. While

sanctions can impose economic costs on target regimes and create pressure for political concessions, their impact is often mediated by a range of factors, including regime resilience, external support, and regional dynamics. Case studies such as North Korea and Iran demonstrate that regimes can adapt to economic pressure through strategies such as internal repression, black-market activities, and reliance on allies, thereby mitigating the effects of sanctions on regime stability.

Moreover, the study underscores the unintended consequences of economic sanctions, including the consolidation of power among ruling elites, the emergence of illicit economies, and the exacerbation of humanitarian crises. While sanctions are often imposed with the intention of promoting democracy, human rights, or non-proliferation, their implementation can inadvertently strengthen authoritarian regimes or exacerbate suffering among civilian populations. This highlights the need for policymakers to carefully weigh the potential costs and benefits of sanctions and consider alternative approaches to achieving their policy objectives.

Overall, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding economic sanctions and regime change. By examining multiple case studies and drawing on diverse methodological approaches, the research provides a nuanced analysis of the factors shaping the outcomes of sanctions implementation. Moving forward, policymakers and scholars can benefit from this nuanced understanding in crafting more effective and ethical foreign policy strategies, recognizing the limitations of sanctions as a standalone tool and the importance of considering broader geopolitical, economic, and humanitarian concerns in international relations decision-making.

5.2 Contributions to Theory, Practice and Policy

This study makes significant contributions to theory, practice, and policy in the realm of international relations and foreign policy. This research delves into the complex dynamics between economic sanctions and regime change, providing valuable insights that have implications for both theoretical understanding and practical policymaking. From a theoretical perspective, this study enriches our understanding of the mechanisms through which economic sanctions can impact regime stability. By applying Rational Choice Theory, the research elucidates how states facing economic pressure weigh the costs and benefits of maintaining their regimes. The findings highlight the rational calculations made by regimes under sanctions, shedding light on the incentives and constraints that shape their decision-making processes. This contributes to Rational Choice Theory's application in international relations, demonstrating how states as rational actors navigate the complexities of economic coercion.

Furthermore, the study adds nuance to existing theories by exploring the contextual factors that influence the effectiveness of economic sanctions in inducing regime change. By analyzing case studies from diverse regions such as North Korea, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Iran, Russia, and Belarus, the research identifies variations in outcomes based on regional dynamics, external influences, and regime characteristics. This nuanced understanding contributes to the refinement of theories related to economic statecraft and regime stability, emphasizing the importance of considering multifaceted factors in assessing the impact of sanctions.

In terms of practical implications, the study provides policymakers with valuable insights into the design and implementation of effective sanctions policies. By highlighting the mixed outcomes of economic sanctions on regime change, the research underscores the need for a targeted and multilateral approach. Policymakers can draw from the findings to tailor sanctions that maximize pressure on regimes while minimizing unintended consequences such as strengthening authoritarian regimes or harming civilian populations. This contributes to a more informed and strategic use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool.

Moreover, the study's analysis of the unintended consequences of sanctions, such as the strengthening of regime narratives and reliance on illicit economies, offers practical considerations for policymakers.

It emphasizes the importance of considering secondary effects and potential counterproductive outcomes when crafting sanctions regimes. This insight can guide policymakers in designing more comprehensive strategies that account for the complexities of regime responses to economic pressure. From a policy perspective, this research contributes to the ongoing discourse on the ethical considerations of imposing economic sanctions. By highlighting the impact of sanctions on civilian populations and the potential for unintended humanitarian crises, the study calls for a reevaluation of the humanitarian costs of sanctions. Policymakers are encouraged to consider the humanitarian implications and adopt measures to mitigate harm to vulnerable populations. This contributes to the development of more ethically sound and responsible sanctions policies that prioritize the well-being of affected civilians.

Additionally, the study's comparative analysis of various case studies provides policymakers with a broader perspective on the diverse outcomes of sanctions across different contexts. Policymakers can draw lessons from the successes and failures of sanctions in different regions, informing their decisions on future sanctions policies. This comparative approach contributes to evidence-based policymaking by offering policymakers a rich dataset of historical examples and outcomes to guide their decisions. In conclusion, this study makes substantial contributions to theory, practice, and policy in the field of international relations. Through its application of Rational Choice Theory, nuanced analysis of contextual factors, and insights into unintended consequences, the research enriches our theoretical understanding of economic sanctions and regime stability. Moreover, the study provides practical guidance for policymakers, emphasizing the importance of targeted, multilateral approaches to sanctions design and implementation. Lastly, the research contributes to policy discussions on the ethical considerations of sanctions and offers valuable lessons from comparative case studies. Overall, this study serves as a valuable resource for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners seeking a deeper understanding of the complex interplay between economic sanctions and regime change.

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